


FOR RELEASE AFTER 6:30 A.M.
TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 1972

STAT



CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

Senator Proxmire Announces Hearings on the Chinese Economy

Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.), Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, today announced Hearings on economic developments in Communist China to be held June 13, 14 and 15 (list of witnesses appended). In May the Committee released a study entitled People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment. This study will be the point of departure for these Hearings.

"Since the President's visit in March, interest in the economy of Mainland China is greater than ever. Yet, we know far less about China than any other large country. Our current study now makes available some basic insights on the weak and strong points of Chinese efforts to maintain a huge and growing population and promote growth. China has been successful to date in meeting conflicting claims on scarce resources: feeding the population, expanding and modernizing their military forces, establishing and improving their industrial base. However, this current economic stability may be disturbed by several possible developments: poor crop years, escalating weapons costs, and political instability from either Maoist programs or his succession crisis.

"In spite of economic successes in China, its Gross National Product remains far behind that of the United States and other major nations. China's estimated Gross National Product for 1970 was \$120

2 -

billion, as compared to \$97⁴ billion for the United States, and approximately \$24⁵ billion for Japan. On a per capita basis, the comparison is much more striking. China's per capita income is only 3 percent of ours and approximately 6 percent of Japan's. Its relative economic weakness means that any military threat from China must be low. They are much too weak economically to pose any serious military danger to the United States. And this situation inevitably will continue for some time.

"The publication, People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment, was prepared by several government departments. Scholars throughout the country had informed us that it would be difficult for them to contribute to the updating of the Committee's 1967 study in the time allotted for the study. Accordingly, we undertook this publication to make recent government information available to the public. We have had excellent cooperation from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and other government civilian agencies in preparation of this publication, particularly on the subject of current and future defense alternatives facing the Chinese and the burden of defense on limited resources. The academic community will make its contribution to our understanding of China through these Hearings."

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The leaders of both houses of the U. S. Congress have been invited to visit China. Mr. Mansfield, the Majority Leader of the Senate, and Mr. Scott, the Minority Leader, have agreed to lead off our hearings with observations from their recent trip. The week following the hearings, Mr. Boggs, the Majority Leader of the House of Representatives and Mr. Ford, the Minority Leader, will journey to China as representatives of their chamber of Congress. Representative Boggs, as a senior member of the Joint Economic Committee, has indicated that he looks forward to participating in these hearings as a helpful briefing for his following trip.

Members of the Joint Economic Committee:

SENATE

William Proxmire (D-Wis.), Chairman
 John Sparkman (D-Ala.)
 J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.)
 Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.)
 Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.)
 Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr. (D-Tex.)
 Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.)
 Jack Miller (R-Iowa)
 Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.)
 James B. Pearson (R-Kan.)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wright Patman (D-Tex.), Vice Chairman
 Richard Bolling (D-Mo.)
 Hale Boggs (D-La.)
 Henry S. Reuss (D-Wis.)
 Martha W. Griffiths (D-Mich.)
 William S. Moorhead (D-Pa.)
 William B. Widnall (R-N.J.)
 Barber B. Conable, Jr. (R-N.Y.)
 Clarence J. Brown (R-Ohio)
 Ben B. Blackburn (R-Ga.)

HEARINGS ON CHINESE ECONOMY

Tuesday - 10:00

June 13

Senators Mansfield and Scott

11:00

Professor Ta-chung Liu
Chairman, Department of Economics
Cornell University

Professor Benjamin Schwartz
East Asian Research Center
Harvard University

Wednesday - 10:00

June 14

Professor Owen Lattimore
Director, Department of Chinese Studies
Leeds University, United Kingdom

11:00

Professor Joyce Kalgren
Deputy Director, Center Chinese Studies
University of California (Berkeley)

Professor Yuan Li Wu
University of San Francisco and Hoover Institute
formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
in current administration

Thursday - 10:00

June 15

Professor William Dorrill
Chairman, Asian Studies Program
University of Pittsburgh

Professor Harold Hinton
Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington U.

and immediately and not wait in any circumstances.

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, I was not criticizing you. I am critical of some of the comments that were made immediately at the completion of the President's address.

You comment on your hope that the summit meeting will be a success. All of us do. I think that not only the summit meeting but the future in Vietnam, the possibility of a negotiated settlement, depends, in considerable measure, on the support of the American people, because I think things are going well. I think things are going well generally in foreign affairs. I think that the President's policy toward the People's Republic of China, has sound policy that is going to provide great dividends in the future—I think our policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is a sound policy, and I think that we do now face a time in our national life where we can get along better with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and if that is the case, it may help lead to a successful completion of the war in Indochina and result in a negotiated settlement.

To a considerable extent, that depends on the kind of criticism that is made, and I am not talking about constructive, thoughtful criticism, and obviously I think every Senator has to reserve his own position. I am just saying that the type of criticism and the timing of it is important and I would hope very much that responsible Members of the Senate and the House could understand the importance of this moment in their national life and not engage in strife and criticism, and I would hope the Congress will not pass any legislation that will undercut the President's position. I say there is plenty of time for the criticism that you speak about, Senator, in the campaign.

Now we need some support, we need reflection, careful consideration given to the delicate position that we face as a nation. It is a critical time; I think it is going to work out well. I think next year when I come back here, you will find that you will have other things to congratulate me about.

Senator PROXMIER. Well, I certainly hope so. Mr. Secretary, it would be a surprise if the Secretary of State ever came before the Congress and said things are going badly in foreign affairs. We expect you to say they are going well. You referred to our relations with China; you referred to our relations with Russia. You see, that is the difficulty. This is more than a defensive action and protection of South Vietnam. This is something that goes right to the heart of our relations with two of the other strongest countries in the world.

That is the problem. I don't know how well things are going with the Soviet Union when we engage in this kind of action or how well they are going in China. I hope and pray that they exercise restraint, but I can understand why they might feel that if their ships are sunk, that if a Russian ship is sunk, that they have to engage in counteraction of some kind then things won't be going well at all.

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE PUBLISHES STUDY OF CHINESE ECONOMY

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, as chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, I am proud to announce publication of an excellent staff study of economic developments in Communist China.

Since the President's visit in March, curiosity about the economy of mainland China is greater than ever. We know far less about China than any other large country. The study now makes available some basic insights on the weak

and strong points of Chinese efforts to maintain a huge and growing population and promote growth. The major conclusions are as follows:

The economic losses caused by the cultural revolution of 1966-69 were far more limited than the earlier economic disasters of the great leap forward in 1958 through 1960. Moreover, the Chinese economy has now fully regained the growth momentum of the years preceding the disruptions of Chairman Mao's cultural revolution.

China's chronic problem of feeding its population has been eased by a modest, but impressive Chinese version of a "green revolution." Nevertheless, in spite of an active birth control policy population growth will continue to place heavy pressure on subsistence.

To date, China has been successful in meeting conflicting claims on scarce resources: Feeding the population, expanding and modernizing their military forces, establishing and improving their industrial base. However, this current economic stability may be disturbed by several possible developments: Poor crop years, escalating weapons costs, and political instability from either Maoist programs or his succession crisis.

In spite of economic successes in China, its gross national product remains far behind that of the United States, and other major nations. China's estimated gross national product for 1970 was \$120 billion, as compared to \$974 billion for the United States, and approximately \$245 billion for Japan. On a per capita basis, the comparison is much more striking. China's per capita income is only 3 percent of ours and approximately 6 percent of Japan's. Its relative economic weakness means that any military threat from China must be low. They are much too weak economically to pose any serious military danger to the United States. And this situation inevitably will continue for some time.

The publication, which is entitled, "People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment," was prepared by several Government departments. Scholars throughout the country had informed us that it would be difficult for them to update the committee's 1967 study, because most of the recent information is in the hands of the Federal Government.

Accordingly, we undertook this publication to make recent Government information available to the public. We have had excellent cooperation from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and other Government civilian agencies in preparation of this publication, particularly on the subject of current and future defense alternatives facing the Chinese and the burden of defense on limited resources. Regrettably, the Defense Department did not see fit to participate in the study, because of reluctance to reveal secret information. This is another example, in my opinion, of overzealous application of secrecy regulations.

I have scheduled hearings next month to permit outside experts to testify on the newly available information.

A copy of the "People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment" is

available from the committee office, G-133, New Senate Office Building—225-5321.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a summary of this study, made by John P. Hardt, on the economic development in Communist China, which is very revealing and interesting, as it indicates among other things that while China has progressed greatly, she still does not have the economy to represent a military threat to this country.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SUMMARY

By John P. Hardt

Five years ago, as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was building up to a peak, the Joint Economic Committee released a pioneering, two-volume assessment, entitled *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*. Today, as the People's Republic of China begins to participate in the United Nations and as relations between China and the United States begin to thaw, it is appropriate to reassess and update the conclusions reached in the earlier study. The present volume, in which 12 U.S. Government specialists analyze China's economic performance, is the result.

Although the authors are faced with formidable data problems—discussed in each of the studies—they are able to support their conclusion that China's economy has shown great resiliency and that recent policies and programs are moving the country into a strong economic position. At the same time, the authors demonstrate that China has many remaining economic problems, the most conspicuous of which are the pressure of population on agricultural resources and the difficulty in keeping up in the world technological race.

The volume starts with two articles on the general economic setting—an overall survey of China's economic performance in the past two decades (Ashbrook), an analysis of economic motivation in China (Jones). The next group of papers are on specific sectors of the economy—industrial development (Fleld), the electronics industry (Reichers), agriculture (Erisman), and transportation (Vetterling and Waggy). Next, problems of human resources are covered in papers on science and education (Orleans) and on population policy (Aird). Finally, China's external economic relations are addressed in papers on foreign trade (Usack and Batsavage) and foreign aid (Tansky).

The authors have provided their own summaries, and the readers will want to make up his own mind when there are clashes in individual viewpoints. Some of the major questions suggested by the analysis of these papers are as follows:

1. How badly was economic development in the PRC set back by the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-69)?

In general, the assessment of the present volume is less pessimistic than the assessment of the 1967 JEC study, partly because of the advantage of hindsight. It is now clear that fairly impressive industrial growth occurred in the midst of the Leap Forward confusion (Fleld, p. 64) and that the remedial measures in the post-Leap adjustment period were timely and effective (Ashbrook, pp. 4-5). Furthermore, the Cultural Revolution—which was just beginning to have adverse effects on the economy when the first JEC study was being published—proved to have no palpable effect on agriculture and only short-lived effects on industry (Ashbrook, pp. 25-30).

The closing of universities for some 4 years will have some lasting effects on the

training of high-level professional manpower, "but the present halting adjustment will, eventually, result in an acceptable compromise between ideology and expedience." (Orleans, p. 205)

As for the scientists, professors and the intellectuals in general, who had to absorb the brunt of the Cultural Revolution:

"The seemingly unrestrained attacks against his Chinese colleagues are likely to be much more painful to the Western scientists . . . than to the object of the abuse who probably has become quite immune through exposure and who is pursuing his daily responsibilities, if not with enthusiasm, then at least with discerning acquiescence." (Orleans, p. 197)

2. How serious were the short and longer term impacts of the Sino-Soviet rupture in relations on Chinese economic development?

Soviet aid was critically important to Chinese industrial development during the 1950's:

"The major impetus to the drive for industrial development was furnished by large-scale imports of machinery and equipment, much of it in the form of complete industrial installations. The Soviet Union was the chief supplier of complete plants. During the decade agreements were signed with the U.S.S.R. for the construction of 291 major industrial installations in China. By the end of 1959, equipment valued at \$1.35 billion had been delivered and about 130 projects were completed. Agreements were also signed with Eastern European countries for the construction of at least 100 major projects and about two-thirds of these were completed by 1969. In addition to supplying equipment for these installations the Soviet Union provided China with valuable technical aid including: (a) blueprints and technical information, (b) some 10,000 Soviet technicians and advisors, and (c) training for 15,000 Chinese technicians and academic students in the U.S.S.R." (Usack and Batsavage, p. 344)

The impact of Soviet aid termination in mid-1960 on Chinese industrial output was soon in coming:

"In 1961, industrial production fell sharply to a level slightly above that of 1957 but only two-thirds of the peak reached in 1959. After the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in mid-1960, the Chinese found that they could not operate many of the heavy industrial plants built as Soviet aid projects, and they were forced to cut production drastically." (Field, p. 64)

However, the shift to non-Communist sources of assistance in the 1960's took away part of the sting, as in the electronics industry:

"The withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960 forced China to turn to the non-Communist countries for assistance. These countries, principally Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland, are currently the source of more than four-fifths of China's imports of electronic products and production equipment. In 1960-1970 more than \$200 million of technologically advanced electronic production equipment was imported from the non-Communist world. The imports consisted primarily of modern military and industrial electronics which China could have produced domestically only after a long development period. These imports as well as imports from the West of special electronics materials and technological know-how enabled China to forego the lengthy and expensive process of prototype development and to expand its electronics production base from 60 major electronics plants in 1960 to 200 in 1971. Years were saved in establishing the production of advanced electronic products for industrial and military programs. (Reichers, pp. 87-88).

Ideally, continuation of Soviet aid to 1967, that is, through three 5-year plans would have served Chinese economic interests best. Yet, as Reichers suggests, the forged shift to

Western industrial sources had tangible long-run benefits to the Chinese.

3. In view of its burgeoning population can the Chinese economy sustain its major priorities?

With the exception of the three disaster years of 1959-61, China has fed its huge and growing population currently estimated to be 865 million. Peking's approach to China's neo-Malthusian problem has been two-pronged—a new investment strategy for agriculture and sporadic birth control programs. The new investment strategy adopted in the wake of the Great Leap Forward involved an increase in chemical fertilizers, pumps for water control, improved transportation, and so forth, and a concentration of these additional resources on potentially high-yield rice land in the south of China:

"The response of agricultural production to the new strategy including the substantial increases in investments in agriculture and the concentration on high-yield acreage—resulted in (a) the restoration of the 1957 level of grain production by 1964, and (b) the growth of grain production at a somewhat faster rate than population in 1965-71.

"As a result of the changed strategy, a new trend line has been established in agriculture, distinctly higher and more steeply pitched than that prevailing under the low-investment policy of the first decade, yet lower than that which could be readily realized given even larger and better-balanced inputs. Output will exceed the trend value when weather is better than normal and fall below the trend value to the extent weather is unfavorable." (Erisman, p. 142).

The three birth control campaigns have had no appreciable effect on demographic rates. Moreover—and this is the most striking point in the population paper—a successful attempt at fertility reduction probably would have little effect on the total size of the population over the next two decades. Aird's four population projections for 1990 range only between 1,319 million and 1,330 million:

"These models imply that even a major and successful effort at fertility reduction in the PRC is not likely to make much difference either in the size of the total population or in the size of the younger age groups, hence it cannot afford much relief from population pressure in general or from such specific problems as the need for education, employment, housing and other services for young people. To escape from such limited and rather discouraging prospects, the PRC would have to find a way to alter some of the factors that have thus far determined demographic experience in other developing countries.

"The principal reason why these models show so little difference even for successful efforts at family limitation is that they assume a correlation between fertility—and mortality trends. It is, in fact, hard to conceive of circumstances favorable to a general acceptance of family limitation which do not also result in improvement in general health and a lowering of mortality. The dissemination of family planning in the PRC has often been associated and is currently being combined with a general drive for better medical care and sanitation throughout the countryside." (Aird, p. 330.)

In summary, the main line of thinking in these papers is that new investment will keep agriculture up with population but that agriculture will provide no extra margin for stepped-up economic growth.

4. What burdens do military development and foreign aid—the power oriented programs—place on economic development?

A reading of the papers suggests that the Chinese have been generally successful both in building up a heavy industrial base and in gradually modernizing their armed forces. Among the major factors contributing to this success are: (a) the control of consumption

at relatively, austere, egalitarian levels; (b) the use of foreign trade to get high-technology machinery and materials, which could be produced at home at very high cost and after long delay; and (c) the partial insulation of the nuclear and other high-technology programs from political turmoil. The military programs command roughly one-tenth of China's GNP (Ashbrook, p. 45) and the foreign aid programs approximately \$400 million annually, or about one-third of 1 percent of China's GNP (Tansky, p. 371). During the next decade, when the cost of series manufacture and large-scale deployment of modern weapons will rise sharply upward, the leadership may face a much tighter squeeze on resources needed for growth. This squeeze would be compounded by the insistent pressure from the population to raise the level of consumption.

5. How successful has Peking been in developing the various economic regions of China?

The authors agree that Peking can point to substantial successes in building up regional transportation and industrial facilities:

"When the Communists came to power, they inherited an undeveloped and badly damaged transportation network. Reconstruction of much of the old network was undertaken during 1950-52, and bold plans were formulated for the extension of the rail, highway, and inland waterway systems. Substantial progress was made during the 1960's and, after a pause during the early 1960's, expansion was again given high priority in the late 1960's. The rail network was extended into the southwestern and northwestern sections of the country, and additional connecting links were built in the east and northeast. The highway network was expanded and improved especially in western areas such as Tibet where no railroads presently exist. The inland waterway network was restored, improved, and expanded. Inland and coastal ports were modernized and their capacities increased. (Vetterling and Wagdy, p. 147)

"In summary, the Chinese have persisted in their plan for the regional development of the country through thick and thin. The original plan which was first to repair the industrial centers damaged during World War II, then to build new industrial bases in North and Central China, and finally to develop the Southwest and the Northwest—has certainly been delayed, but the pattern of development has been retained. Pao-t'ou and Wu-han, for example, are now well-established industrial bases, and a large number of industrial construction projects are currently under development in Southwest China." (Field, p. 71)

PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

The papers in the volume almost certainly will prove of value to anyone interested in the relationship of the United States with the People's Republic of China. The authors have provided a surprising amount of detailed information on the People's Republic of China's economic history, its current economic situation, and its future economic prospects. Although it has not been the purpose of the authors to spell out the implications of their findings for U.S. policy, they have provided us with an informational and analytic basis relevant to that important task. Some future prospects and problems may thus be identified.

Past Western projections of Chinese performance have often seriously overstated or understated the actual future performance. In times of disruption and poor performance the recuperative capabilities of Chinese society have, apparently, often been underestimated. Now, in a period encouraging favorable forecasts it is well to be cautious. A number of problems may arise to disturb an extrapolation of currently favorable economic trends:

May 22, 1972

Natural calamities may play their roles as they have throughout Chinese history; for example, floods, droughts, earthquakes, epidemics, and so forth.

The food/population balance may be disrupted causing short or longer term economic retardation.

The military burden on the economy may sharply rise in response to escalating weapons costs in their nuclear program, force expansion, and modernization to meet perceived needs on the Soviet border or in the Taiwan Straits, or other policy reasons.

Leadership struggles either to develop a better Maoist state or choose a successor to Mao may disturb the current stability.

Institutional changes, as China proceeds on its course of transformation from a traditional to a modern society, may continue to engender periods of instability and disruption. The Soviet experience has been a mixed blessing as a guide to Chinese institutional accommodation to change. From the rejection of the Soviet model the Chinese turned to a "search for a Maoist model". (Jones p. 58) An assumption that the search has ended and institutional stability will now facilitate Chinese economic development would seem premature at this point.

The People's Republic of China has become an economically strong, unified nation. Its capability simultaneously to meet requirements of feeding its population, modernizing its military forces, and expanding its civilian economic base must now be assumed from its record to date. Moreover, its expanding economy and military establishment provide a base for projecting increasing power in consonance with its enormous human resources. Chinese influence may also be felt both through direct use of economic and military aid and the indirect example of its model of development. Thus China may in the next decade or two join the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the West European community in a pentagon of world powers.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. PROXMIER, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Leonard, one of his secretaries.

REPORT OF COST OF LIVING COUNCIL—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. HUGHES) laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which, with the accompanying report, was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs:

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with Section 216 of the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, I am pleased to transmit the

second quarterly report of the Cost of Living Council on the economic stabilization program covering the period January 1 to March 31, 1972.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 19, 1972.

INTERNATIONAL EXPOSITION IN PHILADELPHIA, PA.—A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. HUGHES) laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:

To the Congress of the United States:

In a message to the Congress on September 11, 1970, transmitting a report of the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, I strongly endorsed the Commission's view that the primary emphasis in our commemoration of the Nation's birth should be a nation-wide celebration, involving every State, city and community.

At the same time, I agreed that we should encourage international participation in our celebration. Philadelphia seemed a natural choice as the principal site for an international exposition because it was there that the Declaration of Independence was signed and the Constitution created. Accordingly, I informed the Congress that the Secretary of State was being instructed to proceed officially with the Bureau of International Expositions in registering an international exposition in Philadelphia in 1976.

At that time, I also pointed out that this exposition was dependent upon the assurance of suitable support and a review of financial and other arrangements by appropriate parties, including high-level government officials.

The Chairman of the Bicentennial Commission, David J. Mahoney, has now informed me that on May 16, the members of his commission voted not to approve the proposal submitted by the Philadelphia 1976 Bicentennial Corporation for this international exposition. Among the reasons cited were the large costs to the Federal government, a question of whether it was still appropriate to hold such a large exposition in one city, the Commission's continuing commitment to a nation-wide celebration, and a question of whether sufficient time remained to make all necessary arrangements. The vote of the Commission was 23-4 against the exposition.

Also, I have been jointly advised by the Secretary of Commerce and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, that we should not proceed unless certain basic conditions could be met. There is no evidence now that we can fulfill those conditions.

Under the full weight of these recommendations, I have reluctantly concluded that we cannot prudently go forward with the international exposition in Philadelphia.

I am therefore asking the Secretary of State to take action at the impending meeting of the Bureau of International Expositions to withdraw the registration of the international exposition in Philadelphia.

I have also asked the Secretary to make clear to the Bureau of International Expositions that the United States, and its many State and local governments, will warmly welcome foreign participation—both public and private—in our Bicentennial. And, I am asking the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission to ensure that their plans include encouragement for such participation.

I remain firmly convinced that Philadelphia, in commemoration of its unique place in American history, will and should play a major role in the Nation's 1976 observances, and that the celebration of this birthday will reflect the vital and abundant spirit of our Nation.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 22, 1972.

REPORT OF NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON ADULT EDUCATION—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. HUGHES) laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which, with the accompanying report, was referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

To the Congress of the United States:
Pursuant to the Elementary and Secondary Amendments of 1966, as amended, I am transmitting herewith the Annual Report of the National Advisory Council on Adult Education.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 19, 1972.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. HUGHES) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of Senate proceedings.)

AUTHORIZATION FOR ALL COMMITTEES TO FILE REPORTS UNTIL 5 P.M. TODAY

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees have until 5 p.m. today to file committee reports.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PETITIONS

Petitions were laid before the Senate and referred as indicated:

By the ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. HUGHES):

The petition of "Free the Prisoners Now, Inc.", of Bay City, Mich., praying for co-operation relative to pursuit of efforts in helping to free prisoners, and so forth.

EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972—CONFERENCE REPORT—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. PELL, from the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the